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~lOV
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RICK FOX AUERBACH.t and WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY .as
Trustees of the Testamentary Trust
created under the terms of the Last Will

2 -1959

!~-.~~ 5~~;;~~. -c:;~;f~ --iit~b·~~~

Case No.
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and Testamen t of FREDERICK S.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
BESSIE AUERBACH, MADELINE A.
W.ERNER~

and SELMA A. MOHR~

Plaintiffs and

Appellants~

VS~

FANNIE F. A. SAMUELS~ L. R. SAM~
UELS, and FREDERICK FOX
AUERBACH., and f ANNIE F. Ar
SAMUELS., L. R. SAMUELS~ FREDE.
RICK FOX AUERBACH~ and WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY as
Trustees of the Testamentatv 1 .. rust
created under the terms of the Last Will
and Testament of FREDERICK S~

Case No.

9090

,/

AUERBACH) deceased)
Defendant! and Respondentsr

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Certain omissions from the statement of appellants make
it necessary for respondent to restate the facts before this court.
...

:>
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0 n May 28~ 1938, Fred erick Auerbach died testate. His
will was adm (tted to probate in the District Court of Salt Lake
County on June 1.3~ 1938. In addition to Paragraph Second of
tbe will dealing specifically with the legacies in question,
quoted by appellants at Page 6~ 7 of their brief:- the will had
other provisions relevant to construction of Paragraph Second:
First~

I direct the payment of all my just debts .and
funeral expenses, by my executrix hereinafter named,
as soon as practicable after my decease~ excepting
hov..Tever such debts as are secured by mortgage on
rea I estate of Y.l hich 1 rna y die seized.·'
n

After Paragraph Second are certain other specific bequests
to certain nieces and nephews (including the children of appellant Mohr). The residue is teft in trust for the use of ~'my
beloved wife Fannie Fox Auerbach~! and then to his son Frederick fox Auerbach~ with appe ll.ants to receive one.-third uf
this trust estate in the event of the death of decedenfs son

without issue+

Paragraph Fifth of the will provided:
ult is my wili~ and 1 hereby direct~ that all of the
shares of the capital stock of the Auerbach Company~
a t Jtah corporation~ which l own at the time of my
deathj be offered for sale to mv brother~ Herbert S.
Auerbach, who shall have and 'who is hereby given~
the exc Iusive right to purchase the same within six
months after the date of my death, for such pric~
not exceeding, however~ under any circumstances~ the
book value of the s.am e, and under such terms--except··
jng as is herejnnfter limited to the time in \\·hicb pay~
ment is to be made---as my said brother shall .fix~ Upon
my sai.d brother's declaration of his intention to acquire
my satd stock~ the same is to be transferred and de4
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livered to him and, regardless of any book or other
v a 1ue of said stock~ his decision as to price, manner,
method and terms of payment (subject to the limitation
of time for payment hereinafter fixed) shall be com·
pelled~ or called upon to show any books or statements
of the corporation~ or give any explanation to anyone
cancer ning the basis~ if any, upon v.,rhich my said
brother has fixed the price) excepting, however~ that
full payment of the price must be made within five
years from the date of my death.''

Because .of the provision of Paragraph Fifth of the will
involving the right of decedent's b rather Herbert to acquire
at .any price he deemed proper the Auerbach Company stock,
which was the principal as.set ~ the widow acting in her own
capacity and as executrix entered into an agreement with
Herbert which in short gave Herbert the power to vote the
stock as a substitute £or his option to purchase the same+ The
widow petitioned for court approval of this agreement, notice

of which petition was mailed to appellants on February 4) 19 39~

On May 16 of 1940 the
en titled as follows:

Vl idow

:filed a report and petition

OF PAYMENT OF LEGACIES TO NEPH.
EWS AND NIECES AND PETITION FOR
CONFIRMATION;

HREPOR1~

REPORT OF FACTS UNDERLYING LEGACIES TO

SISTERS AND PETITION FOR
TIONS;

INSTRUC-

REPORT OF BORROWING TO PAY EXPENSES,
CLAIMS) TAXES, ETC. AND PETITION FOR
APPROVAL AND CONFIR:MATION;
REPORT OF SALES AND PETITION FOR CON-

FIRMATION;
5
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REPORT AND ACCOUNT OF ADMINISTRATION
AND PETITION FOR SETTLEMENT~
PETITION FOR CONFIRMATION OF APPOINT~
M~NT OF TEST AMENT ARY GUARDIAN

AND TRUSTEE;

PETITION FOR DISTRIBUTION AND GENERAL
RELIEF.'~

This report and petition set forth facts as to the value
of the estate which would preclude appellants from recovering
the specific legacies referred to in Paragraph Second of the
~ill (but whi~ would not exclude appellants under another
provision of the \Vill from recovery of at least one- third of

decedenfs trust estate if his son died without issue) and
petitioner therein stated ··that your petitioner is willing to
abide by tb e construction of said will by this c:ou rt, .and the
application thereto of the facts, which shall be found by the
court in the premises * * * .'' The petition stated inter alia:
HThat the net value of decedenfs estate as of May
28, 1938, (date of death) as finaHy adjudicated under
the highest appraisements (State and Federal) was a)
follows:

Real Estate -· -~~~·- ··~~--~~-~-- _---$ slooo.oo
Stocks and Bonds ~L--~~-- _·-- 4 7 3,1 00.34
Cash and Cash Items ________
4.291.28
Mise ellan eou s Property __ __ 1 ~20 S. 76

T 0 tal Gross Estate ~~- ~~L- -·~- -~U ~ ~ ~. ~ ~ ·-~ -.$486-,59 7.38
From w hlch the f o 11 o \V 1n Q deductions 'v ere and must
be aJ lowed as Ia wful charges and disbursements:
u

n

Funeral Expenses --------· .. .. $ -~~835.72
Fees _____ ~ ~ ~~-- ____ , 12, 500 . 00
Administration Expenses ~~
55 8.8 8
Attorneys~

6
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Creditors Claims ______________
State Inheritance Tax r··~··
FederaJ Estate Tax --· _________

S,972.88

44t329. 53
89t018.19

Total (~harges and Disbursements ~-"~$156,215.20
Net value of Estate under Para graph
Second of the Will ·-·~~-~-~--~----------------$3 30,382.18 ,;,
The petition further stated expressly that the value of
the residence "v.as not included in the computation because it
\vas owned jointly by the decedent and his widow and that
the value o £ 1ife insurance was not in eluded because all ins urance policies were payable and were paid to the widow as her
sole and separate estate
r

The petition further stated that the expenses and outlays
reducing the value of the estate could have been increased
further by the executrlxts fee to which the widow '\Vnuld have
been entitled (which would have been $4~ 397. 39) had she
not waived itt by an allowance for family support (which was
not claimed) and by the specific legacies to the nephews (total-

ing $14,000).
Notice of ~t approval of appointment of testamentary trustee and guardian~ confirmation of sale~ confirmation of legacies,
etc.~~ was mailed to appellants on May 18, 1940.
On May 21) 1940, the District Court entered an order
to \V hich appellants in their statement of facts do not even
allude. This order recited inter alia~
~o; 1.

That all notices prescribed by law have been given.

*

*

*

*

'!:3 . That under the second paragraph of .said will,
testator directed the payment of 1egacies of Ten
7
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Thousand Do 11 a rs ( $10,000) ~ to each of his sisters, Bessie Auerbach, Selma A. Mohr~ Jen.rUe
Auerbach and Madeline A . Werner, upon condi~
tion~ however~ that the net val uc of his estate both
at the time of his death and at the time of distribution of his es.ta te should amount to at least Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand Do liars ( $3 50,000) ~ and
be paid from the val uc of the estate in excess of
said sum; that the net value of decedent's estate
on May 28, 1938, (the date of death) was leS!
than Three Hundred Fifty Thousand DoHm
($350~000) ~ and did not exceed in net value the
sum of Three Hundred Thirty Thousand Three
Hundred Eight-two and 18/'100 DoJlars $33:0(
38 2 .18) ; that said 1egaci es would not be payable
unless the net va I. ue of decedent~ s estate should
equal or exceed Three Hundred Fifty Thousand
Dollars ($350,000) as of May 28~ 1938; that the
executrix has not recognized any liablity to pay
said legacies and has not paid the same~ and js
in doubt respecting her duty so to do.
·

*

*

*

*

The court ORDERS~ ADJUDGES AND DECREES:_
* * * That the executrix and the estate are exonera~~
from all liability to the sisters of testator hereinabove
named on account of the conditional~ specific legacia
of $1 0;.000 a warded to each of them under said last
will for the reason that the condition upon which they
were payable failed~ as hereinabove set forth, and they
and each of them are barred and foreclosed from all
rights to, or claims against the estate on account of
said conditional, specific legacies~ but not of their coo·
tingent rights under the Fourth provision of sgid will.'~
Distribution of the .residue of the estate to the trust was
delayed several years pending repayments to the widow of
funds which she had advanced the estate for payment of taxes.
8
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The probate file further shows that a notice 'to£ hearing
first account~ with petition for settl emen t thereof and for
distribution of the residue of the estateH was mailed to appellants on June 22, 1946~

A final decree of distribution to the tes tam en ta ry trustees
\Vas entered by the court on July 3~ 1946. In addition the probate file contains certificates of mailing to appellants of each
of nine peti tlons of the testamentary trustees for settlement
of accounts. (All of the above is set forth in the probate .fi 1e,
which is an unnumbered part of the record on appeal.)
Appellant Bessie Auerbach in her deposition) after the
Court had required her to answer~ testified that her brother
Herbert~ who had been asked by said Bessie Auerbach to
handle her affairs (Apps~' Dep. p. 47, In 14-16) and upon
"'··hom she relied to manage her affairs (Apps~' Dep. p. 10~ ln
7-9) had told her in appellant Madge Werner's apartment
in New York sometime during World War II and prior to
Herbert . s death on March 19~ 1945~ that Fred had left each
of the appellants and Jennie Auerbach, now deceased~ $10,000
( Apps.' Dep.. p. 47 ~ In 19 through p. 49, ln 19) and said
appellant Bessie Auerbach thinks she mentioned this to her
sisters (Apps.' Dep. p. 49) ln 21-24) ~
Appellant Selma Mohr testified in her de position that
she wanted her brother Herbert to handle her affairs in Salt
Lake and that he in fact did handle such a:ffa.irs and that she
approved absolutely of what Herbert had done (Apps.' Dep~
P- 96, In 24 through p. 97, In 7). Said appellant further testified
that she first 1earned in either 1940) 1941 or 19 42 from one
of her sisters that Herbert had told them that Frederick Auer-

9
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bach had left each of Pis sisters $10~000 (A pps.' Dep. p. 98,
ln 6 through p. 99, ln 4).
Appellant Madge Werner testified in her deposition that
around 1940 her brother Herbert came to her house one night
in New York and told her and her sister Jennie (now deceased)
that Fred erick Auerbach had left each of the sisters $10,000
(Apps~ Dep. p. 120, In 11 through 22; Apps.' Dep. p. llS~
ln 19-2 5) . She further testified that she had told Herbert to
handle her Salt Lake affairs and that he handled them and
did so to her satisfaction (Apps.' Dep. p. 106, In 14-21).
1

Appellants testified in their depositions tha.t after H erberfs

death their Sait Lake legal matters were handled by Edwin
M. Otterbourg and the then New York City firm of Otterbourg,
Steindl er and Houston (now Otterbourg, Steindler~ Houston
and Rosen) (Apps~' Dep. p+ 16~ In 10-21; p. 85, In 25~ p. 86~
In 28; p. 109 ~ In 2-6) . Appellants were represented in this
action until appeal by tbe firm of Otterbourg, Steindler~ Houston
and Rosen.

On July 12 > 1946, said Edwin M. Otterbourg wrote a
letter to James Ingebretsen~ attorney at law in Salt Lake Gty,
who was counsel for the estate of Frederick S. Auerbacht &
copy of which is set out as Appendix A of this brieC in which
he incqui red as to the amount to be paid to the sis ter.s by reaS.Oil
of the provision of Clause Second of the will providing for
the bequest of $10,000 to the sisters ttout of the surplus of
the net estate of $350,000+'! The file copy of Mr~ Otterbourg

of such letter had upon it at the bottom, '' cc: Mrs. Wernet
and Mr. Otterbourg testified in his deposition that a COPJ
10
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was sent to appellant Werner (Dep. of Otterbourg p. 89, ln
23 through p. 90~ In 1).
On July 18., 1946, James Ingebretsen replied to the letter of
Mr. Otterbourg. A copy of the reply is set out a.s Exhibit '~B~'

In this reply~ Mr. Ingebretsen explained that an
order of the court made it impossible to make payment of
the legacies to the sisters and stated that both he and Herbert
Auerbach had exp Iaine d the matter to appellants and left
with them copies of all pertinent papers. He offered to furnish
any other information desired.
hereto.

Appellant Bessie Auerbach testified in her deposition that
she made no inquiry as to the nature of her interest in tbe estate
of Frederick S. Auerbach (Apps.) Depr 3S~ in 18-29 and
p. 50) . Appellant Mohr testified similarly (Apps. Dep~ p
99-101). Appellant Werner testified similarly (Apps.' Dep. p.
120, ln 19~ through p. 121, In 14). AppelJant Werner aJso
testified that she knew her nephew received some money from
the estate ( Apps~' Dep~ p. 124, ln 12-13) Clause First of
1

L

the wi 11 provided for the unconditional payment of legacies
of $2:-000 each to seven nephews, including two sons of plaintiff Mohr, and the order of May 29, 1940, confirmed payment
of these sums to these nephews.
Appellant Bessie Auerbach testified in her deposition that
she knows of no facts upon which she based the ailegations
in her complaint that respondent Fannie F. A. Samuels intentionally and deliberately presented an incorrect and misleading
report and willfully concealed I rom appellants the true va Iue
of the estate other than the statement from her counsel that
said estate was undervalued and that the executrix made no
11
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disclosures to her (Apps.' Dep~ p. 35t ln 30 through p. 4o
In 19). Appellant Mohr testified similarly (Apps.' Dep+ p.
8 7 ln 29 through p. 94 ln 18) Appellant Werner testifiecl
similarly ( Apps~· Dep. p. 146~ ln l~ through p~ 155, In 9,
esp. p+ 153, In 22 through P~ 154~ ln 7).
r

Respondent Fannie Auerbach Samuels testified that J::ierbert had informed her that he had discussed the legacies with
the sisters and had told them that they would not receive
anything and that she had subsequently discussed the same
matter with appellant Weroe:r and Jennie Auerbach in 1939
or 1940 (Dep. of Fannie Auerbach Samuels, pr 41, In 16-24;

ln 2 4) through p. 48 ~ ln 11 ~ p. 5 l ~ In 8-14)

+

Herbert Auerbach died on May 19~ 1945, and James Ingebretsen died on February 21~ 1954.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. Appellants~ reference to the Memorandum Opinion

of the Trial Court is improper and should be disregarded··
2. The order of May 21, 1940, expressly holding that

the legacies were not payable and exonerating the executrii
from all liability is res judicata and can now be attacked only
upon proof of extrinsic fraud, which is wholly absent £rom
this record+
3. Appellants are barred by the Statute of Limitations and
Laches~

4+ The will "vas proper Iy construed by the court in its
order of May 21~ 1940., and the legacies are not owed to appellants.
ll
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ARGUMENT

I
APPELLANTS' REFERENCE TO THE MEMORAN.

DUM OPINION OF THE TRIAL COURT IS IMPROPER
AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED.
A ppe llan ts make frequent reference to a document en-

titled nMemorandu1n Opinion" which appellants admit was
entered

aft~r

entry of judgment. Appellants omitted from their

quotation of this "opinion'' io their brief that portion ~·hich
recites that this was done ·tat the request of counse 1 for
pl aln tiffs,'' and further omits to inform this court tb at it ~. as

obtained ex

parte~

It is well .settled in Utah that an opinion of the trial court
is not properly a part of the record and cannot be looked to

to ascertain what the court found or decided~ and the judgment
cannot be qualified or limited by any pfior oral or written
opinion of the court or judge~ Gfand Central M. Co. t Mam"
ntoth M. Co. 29 Utah 49~ 83 Pa~. 648 ( 1905); Victot· 1\1. Co.
t'. National Bank 1 18 Utah 87} 55 Pac+ 72 ( 1898) + A fortiori,
any subsequent statement by the court should have no effect
on the judgment. Thus the Supreme Court of Washington, in
striking from the record on a.ppeal a memorandum opinion
written by the trial court after en try of judgment~ stated that
at most it was '~nothing more than a colloquy bemreen court
and counsel.n E! Romano Engineering Corp. t). State~ 8 Wa.sh.
2d 670~ 113r P.2d 549 ( 1941), aff'd after rehearing 12 Wash.
2d 736~ 120 P.2d 1008 ( 1942).
1

•

1

The courts of our neighboring states have consistently bel d
that memorandum opinions are not properly a part of a record
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on appeal. Robinson v. Herring~ 75 Ariz. 166~ 253 P.2d 347
( 19 S3) ; Terry v ~ Terry1 70 Idaho 161, 213 P 2d 906 ( 19 50) ;
Lea County Fair AsJn. v. Elkan, 52 N.M~ 2SO:t 197 P+2d 228
( 1948); Cltfford v. State, 20 Wash. 2d 527~ 148 P.2d 3:02
+

( 1944).
0 f course, the ··opinion merely states that ~ tw hile jt
was not necessary to the determination of the issues of this
casen the court was of the opini~n that the testator did not
intend that state and federal taxes be nincluded' in computing
the total amount of the estate. On its £ace this is a gra tuitoru
aside. It was hardly a statement) as appellants as~ert, that the
legacies ''were clearly payable (Apps~ Brf. p. 21) ~ Judgment
was awarded unconditionally in favor of respondents. Respondents have contended that they were entitled to judgment
for several alternate reasons and, of course, it is well established
that a judgment right in result will not be reversed even though
the reasons stated for it are wrong. Tree -v. White 1 110 Utah
233~ 171 P.2d 398 ( 1946). This court has further held that
where the conclusion reached by the trial court is correct~
though based on incorrect reasons, judgment will be affirmed
on review. RaJmussen 1-'. Dar·is, 1 Utah 2d 96~ 262 P.2d 488
j'

(1953).
Thus the sole issue before this court is whether~ on any
theory~ the judgment should stand. Reference

to the trial
coUI t ~ s ex post facto memorandum is improper and superfluous.
It should be stricken from the record and disregardedL
II

THE ORDER OF MAY 21~ 1940~ EXPRESSLY HOLD~
ING THAT THE LEGACIES WERE NOT PAYABLE AND

l4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

EXONERATING THE EXECUTRIX FROM ALL LIABILITY IS RES JUDICATA AND CAN NOW BE ATTACKED

ONLY UPON PROOF Of EXTRINSIC FRAUD~ WHICH
IS WHOLLY ABSENT FROM THIS RECORD.

Appellants have conveniently ignored the court order of
May, 1940. Yet it is apparent that a court of proper jurisdiction
has already determined this question .some 19 years ago and
this determination is res j udicat a and cannot be attacked collaterally, but only by a separate action on grounds of extrinsic
fraud. The record here not only fails to establish extrinsic
fraud~ but appellants' complaint does not even use the allegation~

Appellants' sole objection to the order of 1940 is that

they believe the court and the executrix were io error io making
the computation, in that they improperly deducted taxes. Re~
spondents disagree and contend that the manner of compu·
tation was correct. But this is beside the point. No one yet
has advanced the theory that trj al courts are in f alii ble-m istakes they can rna ke. But the law for good and sufficient
reason has he1d that a partyJ s right to redress error is through
appeal. Error does not constitute fraud~ nor can appellants
contend that the court or anyone choosing to ma.ke inquiry
was misinformed~ because the very record disproves this. The
petition of executrix clearly sets forth the means of computation
used (deducting ta.xes) and then requests instructions from
the court. Appellants contend nothing more than an error by
a court with proper jurisdiction, after due notice was given.
Each of the appellants has testified that she knows of
no facts upon which they based the allegations that respondents
L5

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

inte0:tionall y and del ibera tel y presented an incorrect and
misleading report and willfully concealed from plain tiffs the
true value of the estate~t other than the statement from thejr
then counsel that the estate was undervalued and that the
executrix made no disclosures to them (see dep. refs. in State~
ment of Facts).
t t

lnteres ting ty~ each of appellants vigorously

denied that

the executrix had ever discussed the question of Iegacies 'With
them at all ( Apps.' Deps~ p~ 24~ 89 and 121), but in their
brief a ppe Uants seek to find extrinsic fraud from the statement of the executrix that in 1939 or 1940 she informed the
appellants that she was sorry tb ey would not receive their
legacies because crthere wasn't enough left for you girls to get
each $1 0, 000~'' The executrjx is merely stating what the court,
being fully informed of all the facts, did in fact .find. Appel~
lants admit that they know of no other facts. How this lone
statement of bona fide concern, which appellants deny wa5
made let alone relied upon~ can be tortured into extrinsic fraud
is difficult to imagine.
Appelants in desperate search for a motive make the
fantastic assertion that there was a great plot between the
executrix and Herbert to assure Herbert of management and

control of the Auerbach store ( Apps. ~ Br£ ~ p. 23) . Aside
from the facts that there is not a scintilla of evidence to support
this and that Herbert's 1ips are forever sealed ., there is ' for·
tuna tel y, con vine ing \V ri tten evidence to the contrary+ There
was no need at all for Herbert to exeru te the management
contract with the executrix to gain voting con tro I of the store.
The will gave him the clear right to purchase all of the stock
I()
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for a pittance. If there had been dark purpose (which it is

rather surprising to hear appellants impute to their trusted
b rather upon whom they relied implicitly) there would have
been no need for Herbert to have u.sed tbis more complex
means of achieving it. He could have had all of the stock
for one dollar and the value of the estate v.rould have been
depleted by over $300,000~ clearly making the legacies nonpay able whether one deducted the taxes or not.
This grasping at stra\vs shows the tenuous nature of
appellants~ claims and the desperate way in which they attempt
to satisfy the rigid tests th is court has es tab tished as necessary t()
upset a prior order by collateral attack+

This law is well established. Once a will has been admitted
to probate and the estate distributed and by decree the
will interpreted, ~·it is not subject to a dillerent interpretation
on collateral attack.H 1\Telson v. Howellsj 75 Utah 461, 286
Pac 631, 632 ( 1930). This is consistent with the general rule
(see 136 A.L.R~ 118{}-Rule of Res Judicata as Applied to
Judicial Construction of a Will) .
Probate actions are in rem. Where jurisdiction is properly
.acquired~ and the appellants here concede this (R. p+ 1), one:os
only remedy from a decree from the probate court is by appeal
or attack for extrinsic fraud. This rule is clearly stated in
Weyant v~ Utah Savings & T1ust Company, 54 Utah 181,
182 Pac. 189, 197 ( 1919) ~ wherein the court stated:

nThis court is committed to the doctrine contended
for by counsel for appetlantl namelyJ that probate pro~
ceedings are in rem, and that where the statutory
notice has been given all who are interested in the

17
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estate are bound by all orders or decrees duly entered
in the particu tar case, and that., ordinarily, ~e only
remedy is by direct appeaL Barrette v. W httneyJ 36
Utah 574~ 106 Pac. 522; 37 L.R.A. (NS) 368. Thi5
court has also held that judgments and decrees entered
by courts of competent jurisdiction) where jurisdiction
of the subject of the action and of the person has been
1egall y acquired, can only be assai 1ed on direct appea.]
or in equity for extrinsic as contra-distinguished from
intrinsic £r a ud.' ~
In fact~ after initial notices for appointment of the persona!
representative have been issued~ no others are necessary, but
are merely given for the convenience of the parties in interest.
This court has clearly so held in Barrette v. Whitne_) supra.
1
,

Nor does. it rna tter that the order of 1940 was not a .final

decree of distribution. This order could not even have been
attar ked in 1946 at the time of final distribution. RaleigIJ J
Estatet 48 Utah 128, 158 Pac. 705 ( 1915), holds that the settlement of accounts, whether of a final or intermediary account,
is conclusive as to a I1 items contained therein~
Appellants object to the forms of the notice of the 1940
petition. This court can take judicial notice of the fact that jn
Utah probate notices are prepared and sent by the probate
clerk) not by the persona I representatives~ and any inadequacy
in phras eo Iagy could not be attributed to the executrix in
any event.
Moreover~ 7 5-14-12 U CA 19 53

provides that if a decree

of the probate court shows that due notice was given~ the
decree shall be cone 1usi ve evidence of that fact. The o£der
of 1940 determined that due notice had been given+ Thus there
18
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is no me rj t in appellants' attacks upon the alleged inadequacy
of the notice mailed to them for the hearing on the petition
Ul 1940.
Appellants cite 75-14-23 UCA 1953. This statute is merely
dec lara tory of the established rule. This is clearly shown by
In Re Rice~s Estate~ l l l Utah 428) 182 P~2d lll ( 1947) ~
\\·herein the son of the deceased was informed by his sister~
the executrix~ at the courthouse on the day of the hearing
of the decree of distribution that there was no need for him
to appear, as the executrix waul d take care of his interests.
In fact the petition drawn by the executrix failed to. take care
of his interests in that it did not disclose certain property which
the son should have received and accordingly the decree did
not give to the son certain property to which he wa.s entitled
under the wilL Within a yea.r after the decree the son com~
menced his action. The court cited 75-14-23 UCA 1953 (then
102-14-23 UCA 1943) which it stated Hsets out a remedy to
the person so injured~ The court then carefully set £orth the
requirements of proof necessary to constitute a cause of action
under this statute (i.e~ that extrinsic fraud must be shown),
citing a~ definitive on the question of extrinsic fraud the case
of United States t-'. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61~ 25 L. Ed. 93
1

'

(1878).
Appellants have quoted from this case (A p ps~ Bf. p. 2 7)
but have omitted certain of the examples of extrinsic fraud
which are helpful in defining what the court had in mind. Thus
the United States Supreme Court included as examples) in
add[tion to those cited by appellants, the following:
1

'' . . . When an attorney fraudulently or without
authority assumes to represent a party and connives at
19
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his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed
corruptly s e11s out his clien f s interest to the otber side
-these and similar cases which show that there has
never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the
case, are rea sons for which a new suit may be sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment or decree
and open the case for a new and a fair hearing~~~
It should be apparent that these examples or the facts
in Rice do not present a 'situation practically identical with
4

the instant case" (Apps.' Brf. p.

2?). Even if one

torture~

the executrix"'s expression of concern as a statement of fa~

it is clear that this is not a case, as was Rice, where tbe execu.
trix said one thing to a beneficiary and represented anothe{

to the court through her petition. Nor should one lose sight
o £ the fact that the action in Rice was commenced within a
year from the entry of the decree, no~ 17 years later as io
the instant case~ Appellants further f ai I to point out that ffi
the second appeal of this case-Rice v. Rice, 117 Utah 27~
212 P.2d 685 ( 1949)-the court pointedly asked: ncan ]t
be said that any executrix desiring to carry out the terms of
the will under such condition would not at lea5t petition the
P to bate Court for an interpretation of the will ?

·?

(

p. 690).

Jn the case now before this court this is exactly what the
executrix did, fully disci osing all of the facts in issue. Conr
.scientious counsel, advising the client after the above decision~
would certain Iy not have ad vised anything more. If what the
Auerbach"'s executrix did is not sufficient to remove the threat
of long-delayed all ega tjons of f ra ud then this court is i~
effect saying that the time-honored practice of naming the
widow executrix of one's estate is fraught \Yith too great peril
for one safely to assume .
1

20
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The facts necessary to constitute extrinsic fraud are only

of the most extreme kind~ and must be proved by ctear and
convincing evidence. Tiller v. Norton, 123 L;tah 49, 253 P.2d
618 (1953 ). For example even perjury is not extrinsic fraud.
Anderson 1-'. State 1 65 Utah 512, 238 Pac. 557 ( 1925). Even
tb e use of fraudulent documents is intrinsic as opposed to
extrinsic fraud+ Chisoltn v. HoNSe, 160 F.2d 632 ( 10 Cic,
194 7) In that case the Court of Appeats said:
T

HFraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral where
it prevents a party from having a trial or from present~
ing his cause of action or his defense, or induces him
to \vithdraw defense~ or operates upon matters per.
taining not to the judgment itself, but to the manner

in \Vhich it was

procured.~) (p~

643) .

Rule 60 (b) of the Utah Rules of Gvil Procedure may
have restricted the r lgh ts of the appellants to attack a final
judgment even more severely. The rule provides for relief from
a judgment procured by fraud only by a motion within three

m?'nths after judgment. The rule further provides uthis rule
does not limit the power of the court to entertain an inde-

pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment~ order or
proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.''
It may well be argued that this restricts any independent
action to facts ~vhich would constitute a fraud upon the court
as opposed to a fraud upon the parties.
Appellants cite Benson v. Ande-rson) 10 Utah 135, 37

PacT 256 ( 1894). There the widow, who received nothing
under an intestate distribution~ was an old Danish 'voman,
who had a very poor knowledge of the English language and
who depended whoHy on others foe information as to her
21
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rights in the probate. The widow of Benson was of necessit1
dependent on others for information as to her rights. It js
clear that appellants~ ladies of means and all of whom had
received property through Herbert's probate .and one of whom
had acted as executrix for at least nvo estates (Apps.' Dep.
p. 10 7 and 112) and whose Utah business affairs were handled
through their lltah accountant and New York counsel (Apps.~
Deps. p. 16, ln 10-21; p~ 85~ ln 25; p~ 86, In 28; p~ 109~ Ins
2 through 6) hard!y fit the category of illiterate agrarian
immigrants. Moreover~ as each of appellants has stoutly
denied that the executrix ever comniunica ted to them at all
( Apps.' Deps. p. 24, p. 89 and p. 121) ~ it is clear that they
did not depend at all on the statement which the executrix
cl arms she made to them. Even more significant is that under
the undisputed facts, the probate court in Benson had clearly
v io Ia ted a statu tory mandate requiring distribution to the
widow, as this court pointed out (p. 257). Under the facts m
BenJ on~ the pro bate (Ou rt under no circumstances could have
been correct. This is wholly di.Herent from the instant, case
where the Probate.. Court was faced, not with a sta~tory
mandate, but with a -question of interpretation u 1timatel y turning on the testatoris intention~ where the Probate Court could
have been correct, and where, as respondents contendt !r
was correct. This distinction was pain ted out by this court in
Anderson ~·. State, supra~ where it said~ ~ It must satisfactorily
appear that but for the fraud the judgment must have been
otherwise: not that it might have been otherwise,, (p. S59).
t

4

A ppe 11 ants c1te certain authorities from other jurisdictions.
In Bacon r·. Bacon, 1.50 CaL 477, 89 Pac ..)17 ( 1907), an error
was rna de in reading the will as to the amount of particular
2.2
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legacies. As the court stated ··This mistake was carried into

all subsequent proceedings" (p. 318) . HThe obvious result
\vas the decision of the court, based on the uncontested facts set

forth 1n the petition for di5tribution'~ (p. 323). In Harkins
v. Fielder, 1 SO Cal. App. 2d S28~ 310 P.2d 423 ( 1957) ~ one
brother executed a petition to the court falsely representing
that he was the sole heir at law of decedent, and pursuant
thereto . after probate~ the court made distribution to him
alone.

go no further than appellantst own quotation
from Appeal of a~ Neil, 55 Conn. 409~ 11 Atl. 857 ( 1887),
One need

to see that the decision was express 1y based upon the admin ·

istratrix

knowledge from
(Apps . ~ Brf. p. 29). In tllorris tJ. Mull,

'"[intentionally

the Probate Courf~

concealing

such

110 Ohio S.R. 623~ 144 N.E. 436 (1924), the mother had
left a legacy to her daughter conditioned upon the daughter
claiming it within two years and then to her son. The executa r
son~ in the final accounting, had represented to the court "I
do not know the address of Myra Mull and have not heard
from her I or more than 4 years past,' r despite the fact that he
had been in correspondence with her and her attorney about
the probate of their father~ s estate during this period., and
had not even informed her of their mother S death.
w

1

Appellants Wlq uestionabl y can cite many more cases to
the same effect, each involving untruthful representations to
the court. But no torturing o £ the facts in the instant case can
fit them into this category. The executrix here made full disclosure of all facts in her petition.
At most appellants here argue that an error of the court,
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resulting after full disclosure to the court, and after proper
notice~ amounts to extrinsic fraud justifying upsetting a prjor
decree. If this be the law all personal representatives act forever at their periL Indeed what more will the law require an
executrix to do? Will any court require her to do more than
make full disclosure~ request the court to interprett give proper
notice~ and personally notify other interested parties of the
conclusions of her attorney and Herbert~ which the court
confirmed ? \\1e submit that the question answers itself. The
stability of our legal system requires that such decisions stand
unless attacked by timely appeal.

III
PLAINTIFFS ARE BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS AND LACHES~
Respondents submjt that the statute of limitations com·
m enced to run in this action at the date of the en try of the
courfs order of May 16, 1940, or in any event at the time of

the decree of distribution on July 3, 1946~ Under either date~
the action is barred now~
Respondents further contend that the undisputed facts
show laches as a matter of law~
Appellants claim that the :fiduciary relation occupied b}·
the widow as executrix precludes and estops her and respondents from raising these issues now. But Utah courts have
clear Iy held that the statute of limitations and 1aches maJ
be raised by those in fiduciary capacici es~

24
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Thus is KamaJ Securities Co. v. '[aylor, 119 Utah 241.,
226 P.2d 111 ( 1950)) the court stated at

page 118:

44

but viewing tbe charge in its entirety tt 1s
clearly one of breach of a fiduciary duty 'vhich would
mean that the £our· year statute of I imitations would
be applicable . ~ . ~~
•••

Wood

lJ.

Fox, 8 Utah 380} 32 Pac. 48 ( 1893), was a Utah

by a plaintiff to enforce a trust. The court
held tbat the claim was barred both by laches and by the statute
of limitations. This decision was affirmed by the United States

.action brought

Supreme Court ( 166

U+S~

637, and 166 U+S+ 648).

From these examples alone) it is clear that there is no

merit in appellants' claim that by reason of the fiduciary relationship per se respondents are precluded from raising either
the statute of 1imitations or laches. This is not only the law in
Utah~

but is true generally. Thus!' in 54 C+J.S. p+ 152, Limita-

tions of Actions, § 179~ it is said:
4

Fid11ciary relationJ. While there arc some decisions
holding that the rutc governing tbe exemptions of trusts
t

from the running of statutes of Jim ita tions applies not
only to express, but also to other fiduciary relations,
it is generally he1d that mere fiduciary or confi.den tial
relations between parties to a suit~ with respect to the
matters in controversy, will not per se prevent the
running of the statute. ~
t

As some au tho ri ties make a dis tine tion of this is sue
tween the trustee

be-

of an express trust and one in some other

.fiduciary capacity, this should be clarified.
4

As a general rulej the only class of trusts not affected
by the statute of limitations is composed of those
c

25.
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technical and continuing trusts which are not cognizable
at law, but which fall within the pro per, peculiar, and
exclusive jurisdiction of courts of equity.'~ 54 C.J.S. p.
1S1 ~ Limitations of Actions, § 179~
The Res ta tern en t of T :rusts states unequivocal i y:
'~Sec. 6~ An executorship or an adminis.tratorship

is not a trust."

The issue before the court therefore is not whether the
fiduciary can r a.ise the defense of the statute of limitations and
laches, but rather when does such a statute start to run ? There
are two lines of authority on this question. One line holds that
the statute starts to tun Vitrhen the fiduciary repudiates the trust
relationship. The other holds that the statute starts to run
when the beneficiary becomes entitled to assert his rightsl
which in the case of a.n at tern pt to impose a constructive trust
for unpaid legacies would be at the time of settlement of the
final account and the decree o~ distribution. Respondents con·
tend that this action is bar red under either test by reason of
the court order of May 21, 1940., which was an unequivocal
repudiation of any liability to the appellants for payment of
the legacies and a discharge of the executrix from .any responsibility to make such payment.
The Utah courts have clearly accepted the ~-=repudiation··
tb eory as to v.,t hen the statute of limitations commences to
run against a fiduciary. In AnderJon v. Cerco11e, 54 Utah 34~,
180 Pac 586 ( 1919), the court held that the statute of limitations v.:ould start to run against a resulting trustee when
the facts showed that the trustee had repudiated the relationr
ship or had done acts inconsistent with it

26
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In ThontaJ

z_.·.

Glendinning) 13 Utah

47~

44 Pac. 652

( 1896) J an action was commenced to enforce a trust resulting
from money which

p1aintlff had given the

defendant~

The

court stated the rule -qutte clearly in this case at page 654:
"It is well settled that, as between trustee and cestui
que trust, the statute of limitations does not operate~ in
cases of express or direct trusts~ so 1ong as such trusts
continue. But \\-·hen the trustee denies the trust~ and
assumes ownership of the trust property, or denies
his liability or obligation under the trust relation, in
such a manner that the cestui que trust has actual, or
even conJtructive, notice of the repudiation of the
trust, then the statute of limi ta tio n s at taches, and
begins to run from that time, for such denial or .adverse
claim is an abandonment of the fiduciary character in
\vhich the trustee has stood to the property.'' (Emphasis
added.)

As the o rde.r of 19 40 was clear1y a denial of liability or
obligation under the :fiduciary relationship~ the only possible
issue remaining is w beth er ap pe1l ants had at least constructive
notice of this a.ct. Our Supreme Court in Burninghan'l t·. Burke,
67 Utah 90~ 245 Pac+ 977~ 46 A.L.R. 466 ( 1926) ~ at page 983
of the Paci fie Reporter defines laches as constituting unreasonable delay either in discovering the facts or in f ai] in g to act
upon them; and if there are facts known v..~ hich would put
a person of ordinary prudence on inquiry~ he will be charged
with such knowledge.

Fox (supra)~ where the court heJd that the
action against the alleged trustee ~v.as barred both by the statute
of limitations and laches~ the court pointed out ~'he [plaintiff]
could have found out by inquiry~ and he says he did not make

In Wood

t.

27
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any'' ( p. 51) . The court a Iso pointed out that the plaintiff
and defendant had had frequent meetings and had at those

tirne5 tnade no claim for his interest in the trust property.
In S[ofts v. Crouchj 24 Utah 377, 67 Pac. 1068 (1902),
the plain tiff~ adminis tra tor of a deceased locator of a mining
claim~ sucd to impose upon the paten tee a trust for the benefit
of tbe estate of the deceased locator. The court held that the
evidence supported a finding that the locator had completely
. conveyed his interest. How ever, discussing the question of
whether the action was barred, the court pointed out that many

years ear I i er there ~~as litigation over the property in question
and at that time the decedent had not claimed an interest in
the property. The court pointed out that the proceedings in

that litigation were public and stated that under the circumT
stances, the unexplained deiay and laches would be con-

sidered sufficient reason for refusing the relief prayed for.
The court,. in discussing laches, pointed out that the death
of the principal witness or witnesses was a factor to be considered in applying the doctrine.
Felknef v. Dooleyj 28 Utah 236, 78 Pac. 365 ( 1904),

was an opinion after rehearing. Ea. rlier in the s arne case ( 27

Utah 350, 75 Pac. 854) the Supreme Court had held that under
the facts~ the statute of limitations did not run. This was
modified in the Later opinion after a re-examination of the
£acts~ the court ho1ding that the records showed that for
nearly ten years prior to the commencement of the action
plaintiffs had knowledge of the fact that Dooley had denied
the trust. The court stated at page 366:

•tAnd the authorities uniformly hold that when a
2R

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

trustee of an ex press trust denies the trust and assumes
tb e abso 1u te ownership of the trust property, and this
cIaim of owner ship is brought home to the cestui que
trust, a cause of action exists in favor of the latter from
the time he receives notice of the repudiation of the
trust by the trustee, and the statute of 1im ita ti ons
begins to run from that time.},

An annotation at 54 A.L.R. 2d 13) entitled t~What Constitutes Sufficient Repudiation of Express Trust by Trustee to
Cause Statute of Liml tat ions to Run,·· discu s.ses the question
of constructive notice, and states:
·~ . . ~ A greater amount of authority shows that
under appropriate circumstances) and particulat'IJ u)here
the rcpudiative act or instrument is a matter of public
recordj the beneficiary of an express trust may be chargea.b le with cons true tive or imp lied notice of the r epu diat.ion thereof by the trustee, with the result that from
the time he is chargeable 'vi th such notice, the statute
of limitations will run agai:1st him in favor of the
trustee\" (p~ 36). (Emphasis added.)
This court in Ruthrauff r. Silver King Western Min. &
Mill Co.~ 95 Utah 279') 80 P.2d 338 ( 1938), held that an
alleged trustee) whether of an express or constructive trustj

could assert the statute of limitations and laches after repudir
atin g the fiduciary relationship by publicly or no to riously
setting up an inconsistent claim. The court held in that case
that an alleged trustee~ .s conveyance of an inter est greater than
he owned, which can only be good by passing the equitable
jnterest of beneficiadest was such a repudiation, and that due
record notice of the conveyance was enough to commence the
running of the statute. In an ear 1y Utah federal case, Curtis
tJ. Lakin} 8 Cir, Utah) 94 Fed. 251 ( 1899)) the court held
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that 'vhere a person "V~t'ho allegedly held a portion of a mining
claim as a trustee for others, and then by his conduct. began
treating the claims as his own, laches would commence from
the time of commencement of such inconsistent conduct. The
the court held the claim barred by laches despite the fact that
the statute of limitations would not have run for another t~vo
years.

1n considering \'It' beth er appellants had at 1east constructive
no ti.ce that the executrix had denied liability, one should consider these facts which are admitted by the appellants:
1 Appellants knew that the will contained. a provision
+

giving them each $10 ~000.
2. The nephews of the decedent each had received $2,000

prior to May. 1940, and this included the two sons of appellant
Mohr~ Appellant Werner also knew of these payments.
3. The petition and order of the court are. public records~
always open to inspection.

4. The notice of such hearing mai ted to appellants \Vas
held due notice by the court in its order of May 211 1940. The
Utah code provides that this is conclusive evidence of tba t fact
(Title 75-14-12 UCA 1953).
5. Appellants in 1946 received notice of a hearing on
executrix's petition for a final accounting and distribution of
the residue.

6. Appellantst attorney made inquiry by letter as to pay·
ment of the legacies in July of 1946, a copy of which was sent
to appellant \Xlerner, and the attorney for the estate repliea
30

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and clearly and unequivocally stated that the legacies would

not be paid and stated that both he and Herbert ( nO\V both
deceased) had informed appellants of this, discussed it with
them, and left them copies of all pertinent papers.
7. Appellants knew they did not receive the legacies, and

yet from at least 1940 to 195 7 ~ they made no inquiry at all

to anyone+
8. The executrix contends she too discussed this matter

with the sisters~ (Certainly a s ta temen t that t~ e a ppell ants
would not receive th~ir legacies is not one that would lull anyone in to a st.a te of non· inquiry)

+

9- The notices given under the probate proceedings and

the probate order are of course in themselves suffici en t notice
to appellants.
Can there be any question that any reasonable person

under these facts would have made inquiry? During this 17year delay, both the attorney for the estate and Herbert, the
confidan~ a.nd financial

advisor and manager of both appellants

and the widow,* have died. The two architects of the probate
are no longer here to justify their actions. Nor do appellants

contend that they were misled into thinking they would receive
their le gad es at some future time. Indeed, one of their a ppa.ren t

"Appellants con sisten tl y refer to the executrix's brother- in-law~
Herbert~ as "Fanniets confidant.t' He was equally the confidant
of his sisters, the appellants. There was nothing sinister about
this. It v;as quite natural. Herbert was the onJy surviving male
adult in a family with extensive business interests~ As appellants
admitted without hesit.1tion, he \Vas also the one \\··ho handled
their Utah business aHairs and whom they trusted absolu tei y~
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objections is that the executrix did not communicate with them
at all. This is denied, but even if true, it seals the door

of

laches even more firmly.
In jurisdictions ~vhere courts of equ1ty and la\v

have

concurrent jurisdiction (as in Utah) ·~if the statute would bar
an action at law it \vill be equally a bar in equity., the mode
of relief making no difference~" 34 Am. Ju.r. p. 55~ Limitation
of Actions, § 59. Under these circwnstances~ laches can only
restrict a maximum period fixed by statute. So while the facts
c1ear JY' sho\V the laches of appellants~ as the statute o £ limitations has clearly run, this is merely an additional ground

for upholding the trial court.
Another quite respectable line of authority hoi ds that in
the case of a ciairn ant of a 1egacy or distributive share of an
estate~

the statute of 1imitations commences to run against
such claimant from the time of settlement of the fina.I account
and the making of the decree of final distribution~ This line
of a nth ori ty is very carefully ana 1yzed in a recent 10-page

decision of the Supreme Court of Wyoming> Wilson 11. Martinez, 76 Wyo. 196~ 301 P.2d 785 ( 1956) This was a claim
by a daughter who while still a minor had been a warded a
portion of her father . s estate by the decree of distribution.
The daughter brought an action against the estate of her
mother~ 1;\rho had acted as administratrix of the fa.ther . s estate,
for recovery of her distr ibu ti ve share of her father's estate,
claiming her mother breached her trust as administratrix. The
d ef en dant claimed the bar of the statute of limitations, and
the court held that the claim was bar redr As the decree of distribution granted the amount claimed (unlike our case where
r

32
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the dtt:ree expressly repudiated the legacy) the defendants
course~

claim that the deer ee was its eIf a re pud ia tio n) but the defendants did successfully maintain that the

could not, of

statute commenced to run upon terminatoin of the fiduciary
relation, even without repudiation, u pan entry of the decree

of distribution.
The analysis of authorities made

by the Wyoming court

is extreme1y thorough~ Since appellants have cited at 1ength
from certain California cases~ it is helpful to quote from the

Wyoming courfs summary of the California authorities:

* * * This

makes it clear that in California the
trust resulting from the relationship of exerutrix or
administrator to the legatee or heir ~7 a s not C( )nsi de red
to be such an express voluntary trust as requires a
trustee to repudiate the trust in order to start the running of the statute of Jimitation~n ( p. 799).
tt

The court was influenced by the existence in its statutes of
Section 6-2 306 W +C~S+ 194 5) which is almost id ent lea 1 to our
7S·12·8 Gtah Code Annotated 1953. The court states at page
800:
nrn studying the foregoing a.s well as a great number
of other cases from different jurisdictions, some of
which have been cited by counsel and some of which
have been discovered through our O\Vn research~ it
appears that in those jurisdictions which have statutes
.similar to our § 6-2306, W.C.S. 1945~ giving dis·
tr i bu tees a right of action at la \V for recovery of their
shares of an estate, it is being held that statutes of
limitation rna y be pleaded in bar to actions brought
by 1e gatees to distr i bu tees against personal rep resen tatives to recover their distr ihutive shares of an estate.
t

The court concludes at page 801 :
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j

nDespite the confusions which were bound to result
from such. indiscriminate descriptions being applied
to trusts, there has emerged in most instances some~
thing akin to agreement in this-that statutes of_ 1imt ~
ta tion will run against the claimant of a legacy or
distributive sha rc when ( 1) the rep resen ta tive either
expressly or impliedly repudiates the trust~ ( 2) the
trusteeship is otherwise terminated. t'
The court at

page S 0 3, uneq ui vocally sta. ted that the

plaintiff \Vas charged

VIr' ith

know ledge of a decree which was

a public record:
··"Whether or not the plaintiff knew of her inheritance was a question of fact. The judgment favorable
to plaint iff requires that we consider it settled that

she did not actually have that koowl edge~ This, however, did not relieve the pl a.in tiH of a duty to act.
The la \~' charged plaintiff with knowledge of matters
disclosed by public records. Wben plain tiff became of
age the la\v presumes her capacity to kno~. whether she
had received any benefit from her deceased father~s
estate+ It then bee am e her 0 \V n responsibility to ascer
tain whether she was en ti tied to receive any in her ita nee
or legar.y from his estate and, with the pub 1ic records
evidencing that fact available to her~ she was charged
in lav.·· \vith that knowledge. See Lyerly t-'. YeadonJ
1937) 183 S.C. 256, 190 S~E . 73 7.
r

•4:There must be an end to litigation and disputes and
it is just as important that there com c a time when
u nasserted rights must be he1d to be forever Iost. The
more complex and involved our civilization and \vays of
life become~ the more necessary it is that the business
and affairs of people be allowed to proceed without a
sword of Damocles hanging interminably over their
heads in the form of possible unannounced claims~ long
34

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

delayed in their a.s serti on and whicht if time1y
cuted, might have been defeated upon merit~'r
Further~

prose~

while pointing aut that plain tiff \Vas a minor at

the time of the entry of the decree and that

~n

certain cases it

is impossible that know ledge of a decree would in fact come
to a child~ the court stated at page .S 04:
qBut~

on the other hand~ justice also requires that
some protection be given to the person or interest
against whom such a right is claimed. The person
may die~ witnesses may die or pass beyond reach~ documents and effects be destroyed or lost and, in consequence, ~~ith the passing of time) the persons and the
ev ldence which were once available to make defense
against_ state claims are lost and gone forevec"
It is su bm (tted that the analysis in this opinion presents

the alternative argument as to tbe running of the statute most
persuasively and that it is consistent VoJT i th the 1aw of the rna jo ri ty
of jurlsdictlons.
Under either theory (i.e~ repudiation or the time of entry

of the decree) plain tiffs are here clearIy bar red.
Appellants characterize the defense of statute of limitations and laches as a nmere technicality~n Aside from the fact
that this court and othets have~ to the contrary, classified such
defenses as beneficial, which the courts ~T i11 view with favor
for sound reasons of public policy~ one need only see the
dilemma a tria 1 coUit "·ould be in if it were asked at this
late date to attempt to reappraise the valuation of this estate
to determine if it had a net value of more than $350,000.
Such a holding would open up a Pandora's Box filled only
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with dead ·witnesses and stale evidence. Any revaluation could
be little more than guess-work.

Appellants contend that the statute did not begin to run
until their New York counsel examined the probate file in
] un e of 19) 7. By this lo_g ic:~ if counsel had not examined the
file~ the statute v.r•ou Id still not even have be gun to run. By this
logic, the claim would never be barred. This result is a legal
absurdity. Appellants lay great stress on the words used by
the executrix in her conversation in 1940. Clearly this would
have been no problem if the executrix had merety informed
appellants that they would not receive their legacies. But,
argue appellants, because she went further and told them wh;~
they would not receive them (i.e ~~there wa.sn ~ t enough left'')
the 5 ta tute is to 11 ed forever. If this is the law, then a personal
representative is better oft to make no disclosure at ail. Such
a result is neither sound in logic nor in Ia w ~ a.nd these con ten~
tions should be rejected.
t

'l

IV
THE WILL WAS PROPERLY CONSTRUED BY THE
COURT IN ITS ORDER OF MAY 21~ 1940) AND THE
LEGACIES ARE NOT OWED TO APPELLANTS~
Appellants by the use of such words as t~clearlyu and
properly ~ try hard to convince the court that the manner of
computation used by the court in 1940 was erroneous. Re·
spond en ts disagree. The sole dispute is whether the term ~ ~1 t= t
value of my estate'J as used in Paragraph Second of the will
should be a figure from which is deducted estate and inheri~
tance taxes.
1

1

1:

f
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·rhere is no automatic answer to this problemr

It is a

question of construction of this particular 'vi 11. Section 7 4- 2· 1
LTCA 1953 provides nTestator~s intentions govern-the will is
to be construed aceo rdin g to the intention of the

testator~~'

Authorities from other courts interpreting other wilJs thus
have limited v a.I u e ~

Let us look at this will and the surrounding facts. Decedent
was a business man of means. He died leaving a \Vidow and
one son. He 1eft the principal portion of his estate in trust
for those natural objects of his bounty. He also wanted to
remember his sisters, which he did in two ways. First~ by
making them contingent remainderman of a portion of the
residue in trust and second;) by stating that he v.rould like to
give them $1 0~000 apiece in the event, but only in the event,
that the net value of his estate exceeded $350,000. Why
would he have picked such a .figure?
Certainly it is most logical to assume he picked this because
he wished at least this sum to go into the trust for his wife
and child and to assure th€m of income in any event from
a minimum sum certain. A minimum of $350,000 at. 5% \vould
,give an annual income of $17.,500.
Appellants contend that decedent intended to disregard
taxes in computjng this minimum protection. 1~o ~ccept this
argument one must assume that the decedcnt did not intend
to assure his family a fixed minimum nest egg, but rather a
com p1etel y in de terminable one fl uctua tirig wit b the character
of decedent s as sets and the a pp Iicab 1e tax rates in effect at
t

the time of his death. It is inconceivable that the te5tator \'/auld
not be cognizant of the large part taxes played in diminishing
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one's estate~ If he had wished that Hnet value of my estate'~
be computed without regard to taxes, he surely Vt;rould have
said so. Respondents contend that their interpretation is. certainly more reasonable.
Moreover, the other facts show the complete good faith
of the approach used. Other means were certainly available
to bring the net value below $350,000) if the estate~s representatives had v,.~ished this. The principal asset of the estate,
221} ·~harc5 of the Auerba(h Company stock~ was) in the petition of the executrix~ given a value o £ $140.00 per share,
although at the time of the death of the testator the value
of the stack of the estate was extreme! y speculative, by reason
of Herbert~ s right to buy it at any price be deemed fit~ Indeed~
good argument could be made that at the time of decedent's
death the stock of Auerbach Company had no value at alJ to
the estate.
As previously stated~ in exchange for the executrix'5

granting Herbert certain voting and sale rights to that stock
Herbert did subsequently waive the right to purchase the stock1
but in that agreement approved by the court on February 1S,
19 39, it '""as a greed that the stock \Vas worth only $100,00 per
share. At such an evaluation the value o£ the total estate would
be $88, 52 0 1ess than the values used by the court when it
determined that the legacies should not be paid~ Moreover,
in computing values for purposes of deciding wbether the
legacies should be paid petitioner and the court used the value
o £ the assets for federal and state~ estate and inheritance tax
purposes ( $486J 59 7 ~ 38) rather than the considerably lower
v.al u e placed upon the estate by the court -a ppoiot:OO a ppralsen
($403~ 738+64).
38
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4
'

Moreover, the will directs first of all the payment of
debts+ I· Appellants apparently con tend that estate and in-

heritance taxes are not debts w j thin the meaning of this provision. Ample authority justifies the contention that estate and
inher.itance taxes are ndebts.n Appellants concede that estate
taxes constitute a lien on the assets of the estate from the date
of death (Apps.t Brfr p. 20}.

In Thompson ~·. Thompson (Tex~ Civ. App.) 230 S.W.
2d 376, ( 19 50) (modified on other grounds at 149 Tex. 632~
236 S.\X'. 2d 779), the court held that federal estate taxes and
.state taxes on transfer of the testator's estate were ndebtsu
within the provision in the 'vill directing that the testator's

just debts be paid. In Penn's Executor v. Penn's Executor~ 120
Ky~ 557~ 87 S.W~ 306 ( 1905), the court held that .. White
taxes are not~ strictly speaking, debts, yet they are obligations
or liabilities~'· and where a testator by Vi-Till di retted payment
of all funeral expenses and ~tdebts'~ out of his personal estate
as soon as practicable and gave the balance of the personal
es ~ J. t e to his wife~ the intention was to include all obligations

and liabilities against the estate of every character, including
taxes. In W acbovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Greenj 236 N+C.
654~ 73 S.f.. 2d 879~ ( 1953) ~ the court held that the v..rord
'~debts~' included federal estate tax for purposes of a statute
prescribing the order of payment of decedenf s debts~ In
Van H on::,er v. Myers~ 98 Okla. 243, 224 Pac. 977 ( 1924), the
court held that taxes due the United States, state~ county or
cityJ constituted a ~~debt" against the estate of the decedent
\\~hich

must be paid before it is subject to distribution to his
heirs or devisees
I
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In addition~ seve ra 1 cour t5 have held that payment of
legacies is computed from the distr i bu table estate after deduc~ion of all

A1enn, 158 Fla. 228~ 28
So. 2d 881 ( 1946), the testatrix bequeathed lO~--o of her estate
to her step-son and all the rest and residue of every kind to
her husband. The court he td that the s tep~son V!rras entitled
to lOf>;· of the net or distributable estate after the payment of
debts, tax ex .and other ex penscs o £ administration and not
1 Oo/o of the gross estate. In Die ke} v. Dickey, ( 8 Cir.) 94
P ed. 2 31 ( 18 99) ~ the testa tor bequeathed $2 0, 000 to his brother,
but further provided : ~~In case my estate and property at the
time of my decease does not amount ot more tb an the sum of
$50,000 at a fair valuation~ then in that event it is my will
that my said brather shall receive only the sum of $1 0~ 000
cash instead of the $2 0)000 hereinbefore mentioned.), The
court he] d that the testa tor obvious Iy intended that the valuation be placed upon the net distributable estate deducting from
the va Juation the debt then owing and \. . hich his estate was
liable to

chargesT Thus~ in Wells

f).

pay.

1\To r can one tgnore th c use of th c word ·~net~'.. \V hich
Black~ s Lau: Dictionary defines as He lear of anything extra~
neo us; \Vi th all deductions, such as charges~ expenses, discounts,
commissions, taxes, etc.'~ (3rd Ed., pL 1239).
It is difficult to follow appellants' argument on rome Df

They contend taxes should not be de·
ducted, yet cite Edu~ards x;. Slocum, 287 Fed~ 651, aff'd. 264
the authorities cited.

U.S. 61 ( 1924), which they themselves state mereJy hold~
that if federal and state taxes \vere ~"included/' net value

of

the estate could not be computed without use of an algebraic
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formula

(Apps~~

Brf.

p. 19). Respondents submit that by

either conceding or denying this point, the solving of the

prob Iem be£ore us is not assisted one whit, a.s taxes were not
nincluded'' in the instant case. Moreover, decisions dealing
with tax problems such as Edwards v~ Slocurn supra, are of no
1

assistance in the instant case where the court is seeking to
find the intent of the testator~ and not the extent of certain
tax structures.
Nor are the cases cited dealing with the wills in

v.l hlch

the marital deduction is used of any assistance (the Auerbach
w iJ l was d ra \V n be£ore the marital deduction \Vas applicable

In Re Lie befmant s W i! !J
147 N.Y.S. 2d 815 ( 19'5), cited by appellants, the testator

as a means of tax reduction) . Thus,

was found to have intended to obtain the maximum marital

deduction allowable and to do that within the context of the
marital deduction this could only be done by computing net
estate without deducting estate taxes~
It is not clear for what purpose appellants refer to the
Federal Estate Tax return filed for the estate. AppelJants do

not <luarrel with the figures. They do not conten·d that assets
were undervalued. They merely quarrel with the means of
computation of net value. For this purpose~ tne tax return
is irrelevant and immated al. Surely decedent did not j ntend
~·net value of my estate~ both at my death and at the time of
distribution'·· to mean the taxable net estate as sho\vn on a
Federal Estate Tax Form. Appellants further believe that
any reference to the document produced at the executrix. s
deposition is improper. Bee au se the document was unsigned
and merely came from another law firm~s file~ respondents
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expressly refused to stipulate that it was an acrur ate copy
of the return actually filed (Dep~ of Fannie F. A. Samuels,
P- 79-81). It was not introduced ~~subject to verification~· as
appelJants state (AppsL· Brf. pL 9).
Respondents vigorously assert that the question of reinterpretation is not properly before this court, but in any event~

in 1ight of all of the facts, the legacies were proper1y construed by the court order of 1940.

CONCLUSION
There is no merit in appellants' attack on the decree of
May 2l, 1940, as the will was properly construed~ Moreover,
appellants are bar red by the terms of the order of May 21~
19 40~ from re-li tiga ting their claim.. The record is complete] y
devoid of facts to justify a .finding that this prior order wa5
obtained by extrinsic fraud, and in fact, this was not the case.
A ppella.n ts are also bar red both by the statute of limitations
and their Iaches. For this reason~ respondents contend that
appellants' action was properly dismissed.
Respectful Jy submitted,

A.

J.

Colton

FABIAN & CLENDENIN
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah
Atlorne}'J

for Respondents
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APPENDIX A

July 12, 1946
Re: Estate of Fred erick S. Auerbach
Dear Jim:
Receipt is acknowledged of your letter of July 9 ~ 1946
·with enclosures~ and I will attend tc the rna tter o £ the transfer

of the certificates in due course.
There are some other 1oo se ends that I ran across
ought to be cleared up.

'\\T h1ch

In the Deseret Co. Mrs_ Fanny Fox Samuels holds Certificate No. 10 for 500 shares_ There is Certificate No. J 1 for 500
shares in the name of Frederick S7 Auerbach, but there still
remains Certificate No. 12 for 2000 shares in the name of
Fre-derick S. Auerbach. The remaining stock of the company
is held 3000 shares still in the name of Herbert S. Auerbach
and 3000 shares in the name of Beatrice Fox Auerbachr This
company may never amount to anything~ but as the thing
stands, I think the stockholders ought to be straightened out.
With regard to Her bertts stock, that \Vas purchased by
hi~ sisters and can, of course, be transfer red in due course. Mrs.
Beatrice Auerbach can handle her stock free 1y of course. But
your order of distribution of the estate of Frederick Sr Auerbach
should probably authorize the transfer of the certificate for
2000 shares abovermentioned to the Trustee.
Mr. Clark has the minute book and the stock share books.
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By the v..Tay] in clause Second of Frederick S. Auerbach's
will is a provision that out of the surplus of the net estate of
$3 50 ~000 bequests of $10,000 were payable to his sisters. Now
that the est a. te is com ptetely administered~ I would appreciate
it if you could let us have a summary statement of what it
amounted to~ if it is not too m uc::h trouble.
With kindest regards,
Sincere! y yours,
Edwin M. Otterbourg

To: James Ingebretsen, Esqr
Ingeb retsen, Ray, Rawlins &
Christensen
I 0 11 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1, Utah

AIR MAlL
cc: Mrs. Werner
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APPENDIX B

lNGEBRETSEN, RAY1 RAWLINS & CHRISTENSEN
Attorneys and Counselors
Suite 1011-17 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City 1
July 18, 1946

RECEIVED
JULY 22, 1946
Mr~ Edwin
Otterbourg~

M. Otterbourg
Steindler & Houston

200 Fifth Avenue

New York City, New York
Dear Ed:
I acknowledge your kind favor of July 12th. I am beginning \v hat I hope will prove a 'Vacation. I am spending a few
days at home in pre lim.lnary prepa rtion s for a trip to visit my
son in los Angeles. During the few days required for that
purpose I will be available through my secretary+ She will also
know my address in Los Angeles when I reach that city. I mention this in case something urgent should arise during my
absence.

I w i11 now attempt to answer tb e two qucstions which you
submitted.

First: Deseret Development Company~ George~ Fred and
Herbert initiated this en te rp rise a bon t the time ( 1 916) v,r hen
the T i ntic Standard Mining Company began profitable operations in the sv..·ale near the plains of Juab County. I believe the
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boys had an idea that the ore business found in Tintic Standard
might extend under the pta in. At any rate~ they picked up considerable grazing ground extending east and north of the mine.
Some of the ground 'vas purchased prior to the death of George
and more prior to the death of Fred. Herbert bought still more
for several years but seemed to abandon alJ interest quite a
f e\\.. years ago. A litt1e rent has been derived from grazers but
hardly enough to pay taxes~ Clark has received tbe rent, paid
the taxes and other expenses and then assessed the ov.•ners
for the deficit. Fred donated a few shares to his wife and a
1esser a mount to his son. However, the ownership was confined to the three brothers on the basis of about one-third each.
The project was finally in corpora ted under the name of Deseret
Development Company and stock was issued in proportion to
tl1 e amounts coot ributed by the three brothers. I be Ii eve you
finally Jocated the books ro Mr. Clark's hands~ It .seems to me
your eli en ts ~ to get her with Fannie and Be a~ or her daughters,
as the present stockholders, should agree upon a new board
of directors and officers~ whereupon it might be advisabJ e to
leave this enterprise, together with any bookkeeping and tax
returns incident thereto, in the hands of either Mr. Kelley
of l\.1 r. Co 11 ins. I agree "vi th your s u ggestlon that if and when
the company is reorganized you should delegate some one to
examine and appraise the property with the view to obtaining
recommendations or a decision on whether to put it to some
profitable use or dis pose of it or perhaps hold it indefinitely,
as the boys have done.
Second: Fred's legacy to his sisters. At an early date in
the administration of Fred~ s estate reports were submitted to
the court 'vith respect to the closing value and also the final
net value of h i.s estate. This value proved to be under S350,000.
There is on file in the Cler kt s off ice in this proceeding a report
covering this entire matter~ together with an order of the
court under which it proved impossible to make any paymeot
to Fred s sisters. I can secure for you certified copies of thes-e
p.apers if you desire. 0 n the other hand~ on your next visit I
can let you have copies in my file of all papers with the libenj'
t
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to make such excerpts therefrom as you desire+ This matter
was all handled under the very c 1ose supervision of Mr. Herbrrt. He and I were obliged both before and after this deter·
m•nation to vis it New York, and he alone on one or rnro
occasions~ and both of us on one occasion, pres en ted the en tire
matter to the girls and left with them copies of ail pertinent
r ~t pers. I would be pleased to go over this in greater detail
\vhen we next meet.

I£ and Vt~" hen you decide on a.n y course of a(tion with respect
to Deseret Develo pm en t Company unless that can a wait your
next vis it, I will be glad to do anything within my power
provided you "VIt ill have the minute book .and stock book sent
l

J

1

to my

office~

With very kindest regards and best wishes~ I am

Sincerely,

Is/ James Ingebretsen (rk)
JAMES INGEBRETSEN

JI:RK
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